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The Strength of Knowledge in Plato’s Protagoras 
 
During a discussion about the unity of virtue, Socrates begins questioning Protagoras about his 
attitude toward knowledge, to see whether he agrees with the Many concerning this.  The Many 
contend that knowledge is something weak, and that it often gets dragged around by other things 
(anger, pleasure, love and fear). But Socrates and Protagoras hold that the Many are wrong; they 
undertake to defend the following thesis against the Many: 
(KS)  knowledge is something strong and ruling, which cannot be overcome by pleasure       
 (352b). 
 
This thesis introduces an apparent digression, as Socrates begins to discuss the phenomenon of 
moral weakness.  Often, a man who knows which action is best chooses nevertheless to perform 
a different action instead.  This is the description we are given of weakness, and the Many 
attempt to provide an explanation for the weak man’s error (    ).1 
 
(E)  often a man knows 𝜙 to be bad, yet nevertheless he performs 𝜙 willingly because he 
is defeated by pleasures (352d). 
 
In response, Socrates seeks to clarify the prevailing attitude toward pleasure, which turns out to 
be entirely hedonistic.  Initially, it had appeared as though the Many held a modest view of 
pleasure, that some pleasures are good and others are bad.  But upon further inspection, Socrates 
and Protagoras discover that the Many regard certain pleasures as bad, only because they 
eventually produce long-term pain (e.g. poverty, sickness, etc.).  And similarly, they regard 
certain pains as good, only because they eventually produce long-term pleasure.  The Many, 
                                                          
1 To be more precise about the description of weakness in our dialogue, it is part of the description that the weak 
man’s action is an error (   ), that he knows that it’s an error, and that he performs the action willingly, 
even though he didn’t have to perform it (ἐὸὴά.  See, for instance, 355a5-d5. 
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therefore, have no other criterion of goodness than pleasure, and no other criterion of badness 
than pain.  They are committed to ethical hedonism: 
 
(H) :     (Ha) All pleasure (qua pleasure) is good (353e), and  
(Hb) All good is pleasure; there is no other criterion of goodness (354e). 
   
But once hedonism (H) is secured from the Many, Socrates informs them that, when taken 
together with hedonism, their previous explanation of weakness (E) becomes ridiculous 
(ῖ. Socrates intends to make this perfectly clear to them   ἔ).  
Unfortunately, the demonstration he provides is anything but clear.  At one point in the text 
(358c), Socrates introduces his intellectualist thesis (no one errs willingly), which brings to mind 




 (PH)  necessarily, men must always choose the action they think most pleasant (358dc). 
 
 
Of course, the introduction of psychological hedonism complicates things.  If Socrates is relying 
on (PH) during the demonstration, then he is probably begging the question against the 
phenomenon of weakness.   
Commentators have tied themselves in knots trying to understand this portion of the 
Protagoras.  It has been described as an argument of “labyrinthine complexity, densely 
concentrated, elliptical at crucial points, yet presented with an air of conviction that marks it as 
something more than a display of sophistical fireworks.”3  In this paper, I put forward a new 
interpretation of Socrates’ argument— a modified version of (what I call) the epistemic 
                                                          
2
 Under the assumption of ethical hedonism (H), where pleasure is the only good, the intellectualist thesis seems to 
imply psychological hedonism (PH).  If people regard pleasure as the only good, and people always do what they 
think is best, it follows that people always do what they think is most pleasant.  So, Socrates introduces (PH) 
alongside the intellectualist thesis (356b).     
 
3
 Gallop (1964), p.1-2 
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interpretation.  On the epistemic interpretation, (E) is ridiculous because it attributes knowledge 
to an agent while also claiming that he has no such knowledge. Gallop’s (1964) original 
epistemic interpretation employs both the intellectualist thesis and psychological hedonism to 
establish the contradiction.  In fact, most interpretations assume that these principles are 
operative.
4
  I depart from the majority of commentators, and from Gallop, by arguing that 
Socrates does not employ intellectualism or psychological hedonism (PH) in his refutation of the 
Many.  Socrates employs a form of psychological eudaemonism.  This makes more sense of the 
argumentative details.  If correct, my interpretation will challenge the notion that the passage 
amounts to a ‘Socratic denial of akrasia.’  It will establish instead that it is merely an argument 
for the strength of knowledge (KS)
.5
  After providing a brief overview of the argument (section 
II), I will reject a competing interpretation (section III) and then make the necessary 
modifications to the epistemic interpretation (section IV). 
 
II. Neutral Overview of Socrates’ Argument (355a - 358d) 
 
At 355a, Socrates begins his argument against the Many.  He undertakes to show that, on the 
assumption of ethical hedonism (H), their explanation of weakness (E) becomes ridiculous 
(ῖ).6  Even further than this, Socrates undertakes to demonstrate what the experience 
                                                          
4
 Wolfsdorf (2006), Penner (1991), Weiss (1990), Klosko (1980), Gallop (1964), Vlastos (1969), Santas (1966).  
Only Dyson (1976) takes a stance against this. 
 
5
 The modern understanding of akrasia involves acting contrary to what one believes to be best.  However, Socrates’ 
argument denies the possibility only of acting contrary to what one knows to be best, since knowledge is something 
strong and ruling. 
 
6
  Socrates’ demonstration takes the form of a reductio, but as we shall see, there is much debate over the type of 
absurdity (E) is reduced to.  This is the interpretive problem with which I will be concerned.  Another interpretive 
problem concerns the identification of pleasure with good (H), which is essential to Socrates’ demonstration, but 
appears to be wholly out of tune with his moral outlook.  Considering its central role in the dialogue, commentators 
have wondered whether (H) represents Socrates’ own position, or whether it is merely adopted ad hominem against 
his interlocutors.  I cannot deal with the issue in any detail, but let me say a few words.  Socrates uses one belief of 
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 𝜍of being overcome by pleasure really is.  His method is to exploit the identification of 
pleasure with good, and pain with bad, implicit in the hedonism (H) of the Many.   
 
“The ridiculousness of this [explanation] will become clear if we stop using all these names together—
pleasant, painful, good, and bad—and since they have turned out to be only two, call them by only two 
names—first of all good and bad, and after that,  pleasure and pain.”       (355a-b)  
  
Socrates means to apply two substitutions to the explanation (E).  In the first substitution, he will 
replace ‘pleasures’ with ‘goods.’ And on the second substitution, he will replace ‘bad’ with 
‘painful.’  The explanation, upon the first substitution, becomes the following: 
 
(Eg)  often a man knows 𝜙 to be bad, yet nevertheless he performs 𝜙 willingly because 
he is defeated by goods (355c). 
 
At 355c, Socrates claims that an arrogant questioner will laugh at (Eg), and say that it is 
ridiculous (ῖWhat precisely the arrogant questioner finds ridiculous, however, remains 
unclear.  Socrates never elaborates.  He simply begins to analyze the explanation.   By 
description of the case, the weak man knows which of the available actions is best; yet he 
performs a worse action instead.  In fact, he performs a bad action, knowing that it is bad.  And 
the Many allege that he commits this error because he has been “defeated (ἡώ𝜍by 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the Many (H) to reveal an inconsistency with another belief of the Many (E).  As a result, the passage has been 
recognized as “a perfect example of Socrates’ favorite mode argument, displaying the overall structure of an 
elenchus.
”
 Like any instance of the elenchus, Socrates need not accept the required premise (H), nor need he reject it.  
And there seems to be very little evidence either way in the Protagoras.  Thus, conclusions about Socrates’ personal 
attitude toward (H) are often reached externally by reference to other dialogues.  Although it has been argued that 
(H) showcases a more generous view of pleasure than the view under assault in later dialogues (Gorgias and 
Republic), I agree with those commentators point to a startling contrast from the Phaedo, where practical reason 
does not aid the maximization of pleasure (as it does in the Protagoras).  Practical reason is depicted there as a rival 
to the hedonistic calculus; and the philosopher is depicted as one who pursues practical wisdom (ό𝜍) instead 
of the maximization of pleasure.  In the Protagoras, Socrates contents himself with a (single) widely-recognized 
good— pleasure.  Once he does this, he is able to demonstrate the unparalleled importance of knowledge to the good 
life.  Just as in the Laches and Charmides, we are given a conception of virtue as “the knowledge of good and bad.”  
Yet, only in the Protagoras does Socrates manage to provide an approximation of how that knowledge might look.  
By restricting the present discourse to a “shared zone of moral choice,” he manages to offer a limited portrait of the 
knowledge that is virtue. 
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goods.”  Yet, the goods by which he has been defeated are not worthy (ύἀίof the 
victory.
7
  This can only mean that the weak man’s action 𝜙 contains both good and bad 
consequences, where the bad consequences outweigh the good.  Thus, the questioner infers that 
the weak man knowingly accepts (ά) greater evils as the price for securing (ἀί) 
lesser goods.
8
   We should acknowledge that the explanation sounds rather strange.  We might 
wonder, for instance, what it means for someone to be “defeated by goods” which are 
outweighed by evils.  But without further elaboration, Socrates continues with the second 
substitution.  The explanation, upon the second substitution, becomes the following: 
  
(Ep)  often a man knows 𝜙 to be painful, yet nevertheless he performs 𝜙 willingly 
because he is defeated by pleasures. 
 
Again, the weak man has performed an action 𝜙 that produces both pleasures and pains.  But the 
pleasures by which he is defeated are, by hypothesis, not worthy (ύἀί of the victory.  
His action is painful on the whole.  This can only mean that the pleasures are smaller (fewer, or 
less intense) than the pains attending the action, so that the pains outweigh the pleasures.  Of 
course, once hedonism (H) has been assumed, the value of an action must be determined solely 
                                                          
7
 Concerning the role of this adjective-- ἀίIt is unclear what exactly it means for someone to ask (as the 
arrogant questioner does at 355d) whether the goods are worthy of conquering the bads, or vice versa.  Vlastos 
(1969) was first to observe that ἀίis a value-term.  ἀίimplies that the goods and bads have a certain value.  
Thus, the questioner is asking whether the goods (i.e. the pleasures) by which our man is defeated are superior to the 
bads (i.e. pains), which also accompany the action.  Yet, since the weak man’s action is an error, the goods are no 
match for the bads. 
 
8
 The verb άand the particlehave also been cause for controversy At 355 e2, the weak man  is said 
to take (άgreater evils ἀί lesser goods.  The verb, ά, can take different meanings.  Santas 
interprets it as an intentional act on the part of the agent, rendering it “preferring,” or “choosing,” while other 
interpreters follow a more common reading, e.g. “taking,” “accepting.”  The particle is perhaps even trickier.  The 
most common way of rendering is to render it “instead of” or “in exchange for,” but Gallop (1964) has made 
the important observation that these translations imply that the agent has not taken the goods along with the bads.  
Thus, many commentators agree that ἀίshould be rendered “in return for securing.” Much of this discovery goes 
to J.L. Stokes (1913), who first perceived a solution to the interpretive puzzle.  In his (1913) he suggested that 
“goods” and “bads” should not be understood as alternative courses of actions, but rather as consequences (or 
effects) of a single course of action. 
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by the sum quantity of pleasures over pains.  With that said, however, some pleasures are 
experienced more immediately than others, some more (temporally) remote.  And Socrates 
readily acknowledges this (356a5).  But since the nearness or remoteness of a pleasure cannot 
affect its actual size, Socrates insists that such temporal distance cannot affect the overall value 
of an action.   
Now according to (Ep), the weak man knows the values of the actions available to him.  
So what could possibly motivate him to choose a bad action?  Socrates thinks he can explain.  
Although the nearness or remoteness of a pleasure cannot affect its actual size, the nearness or 
remoteness of a pleasure can affect its apparent size (356c).  Just as visible objects appear larger 
when closer in proximity to the observer, pleasures and pains appear greater when (temporally) 
near to the agent.  This is what Socrates calls “the power of appearance” (ἡῦ έ 
ύ𝜍ts illusory affect often causes confusion in the moral agent.  Thus, to avoid a 
miscalculation of value, the agent must counteract this appearance.  He must place each pleasure 
and each pain in the same scale, regardless of temporal distance, and establish whether the 
painful consequences outweigh the pleasurable, or vice versa (356b).  In other words, the moral 
agent must develop an expertise— the skill of measuring relative quantities of pleasures and 
pains.  This “science of measurement” ἡὴέwill procure expert knowledge of 
the overall value of any given action.   
According to Socrates, provided that hedonism (H) is true, such knowledge turns out to 
be our salvation in life (ί, since the power of appearance will no longer cause the man 
who has it to waver in his judgment concerning what to do.
9
  Being “defeated by pleasures” is 
                                                          
9
  Socrates suggests that the power of appearance will cause one to vacillate, or to “waver up and down concerning 
the same things.”356D4  
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then equated with being confused or swayed by the illusory power of appearance.  One who is 
swayed by the power of appearance is swayed because he lacks the science of measurement.  
Thus, being defeated by pleasures is merely a form of ignorance— what Socrates calls “the 
greatest ignorance.”  At 357e, having secured these points, Socrates now reminds the 
hypothetical Many that, although they would have laughed at such a conclusion initially, they 
now see that they would have only been laughing at themselves (ά since they 
really agree that being ‘defeated by pleasure’ is nothing more than ignorance. 
Finally, at 358a, Socrates turns his attention back to the Sophists.  Addressing the 
Sophists, he secures agreement to the explanation just offered, and subsequently expresses the 
principle of psychological hedonism. 
 
“If then, the pleasant is good, no one who either knows or believes that there is another possible course of 
action, better than the one he is following, will ever continue on his present course of action when he might 
choose the better.”  (358 b-c) 
 
At this point, Socrates defines ignorance as “having a false opinion (ὸῆἔόand 
being mistaken in matters of great moment.”  Once he establishes these details, he immediately 
expresses his intellectualist thesis that no one errs willingly. 
 
“Then it must follow that no one willingly goes for bad things or things he believes to be bad.  To make for 
what one believes to be bad, instead of making for the good, is not, it seems, in human nature, and when 
faced with the choice between two evils no one will choose the greater when he might choose the less.”  
(358c-d) 
 
The intellectualist thesis is introduced here (alongside psychological hedonism) as a conclusion, 
but subsequently employed in an argument against Protagoras’ initial claim, which says that 
courage is different from the other virtues (wisdom, piety, justice and temperance).  The 
demonstration is complex.  As we shall see, it involves many pitfalls that require attention.   
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III. What’s so Ridiculous? 
 
 
Commentators disagree about where the ridiculousness of (E) is made clear in the text 
 ἔ), and what exactly it consists in.10  According to the psychological 
impossibility interpretation, explanation (E) is ridiculous because it reduces to the claim that 
men often do what cannot be done.  More specifically, (E) suggests that men often perform a 
psychologically impossible task.  Socrates’ argument is structured so as to include psychological 
hedonism (PH) — the most controversial component of the interpretation.  It is alleged that, in 
addition to ethical hedonism (H), psychological hedonism (PH) plays a significant role in 
Socrates’ argument.  In other words, the argument assumes that all voluntary action is aimed at 
achieving pleasure, and that no one can knowingly accept (ά) the lesser of two 
available pleasures.  This is inconsistent with the explanation (E) offered by the Many, which 
states that men often knowingly and willingly perform the inferior (or less pleasant) action 
because they are defeated by pleasures.
11
 
                                                          
10
  Dyson provides an interpretation worth noting.  He suggests that the ridiculousness of (E) is nothing very 
technical, just an immediate fatuousness, or silliness.  In other words, (E) is supposed to appear silly upon the first 
substitution, no later than 355c.  I agree in part.  However, this interpretation is incomplete. Socrates says the 
ridiculousness of (E) will become clear “if we stop using many names together,” and instead use one pair of names 
at a time.  It is made explicit that, since there are two pairs of names, Socrates will employ two separate substitutions 
in order to make this clear.  For us to suppose the ridiculousness of (E) to be fully demonstrated already after the 
first substitution would require us to overlook the plan Socrates laid down.   
 
11
  Different versions of this interpretation have been offered by Santas (1966) and Vlastos (1969).  On either 
account, the Many are said to have given an explanation which contains a psychological impossibility due to the 
inclusion of (PH).  On Santas’ account, άis taken in the sense of “preferring,” or “choosing,” so that (PH) 
contradicts the explanation (E) because it is impossible to knowingly prefer the lesser of two available actions.  
Vlastos, on the other hand, assumes that two additional Socratic principles are operative in the demonstration:  (S1) 
If one knows that X is better than Y, one will want X more than Y, and (S2) If one wants X more than Y, one will 
choose X rather than Y.  These principles are never stated in the demonstration, but Vlastos thinks that they are 
operative nevertheless.  Moreover, these principles are derived from psychological hedonism (PH), which directly 
conflicts with explanation (E) of the Many.   
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This interpretation can only be made tenable by strong evidence of (PH) within the 
argument.  Three distinct passages have been offered as evidence.   As early as 354c, during an 
attempt to clarify the prevailing attitude toward pleasure, Socrates secures agreement to the 
statement that the Many “pursue (ώ pleasure as good, and flee (ύpain as bad.”   
Now, this statement certainly doesn’t exclude psychological hedonism; it could even be asserted 
within the context of psychological hedonism.  But it cannot serve as evidence here in favor of 
(PH) over (H)— i.e. we have no reason to treat it as an expression of psychological hedonism 
rather than ethical hedonism.  In fact, the context plainly indicates that the passage expresses the 
values of the Many.  The Many have no other criterion of goodness than pleasure, (Hb).  Most 
commentators agree, therefore, that this is “a claim about their ethics in practice.”12 
A more convincing passage occurs at 356b-c.   This passage takes place after the second 
substitution, and within the context of the science of measurement.  It contains three verbal 
adjectives—  έέandὐέwhich are ambiguous.  The verbal 
adjectives could be rendered ‘must’ or simply ‘ought to.’  At 356b, Socrates is explaining how 
the good man assesses pleasurable and painful consequences, placing them together in the same 
scale, regardless of temporal distance.  It is unclear, however, whether Socrates intends to say 
that one must choose the action deemed most pleasant overall (i.e. psychological hedonism), or 
simply that one should choose the action deemed most pleasant overall.  In other words, we must 
decide whether the passage constitutes a descriptive claim about what must be done (of 
psychological necessity), or a prescriptive claim about what ought to be done (by prudential 
obligation). 
                                                          
12
 See Dyson (1976) p.33 
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In order to make an intelligent decision on this score, it is necessary to pay special 
attention to the context in which the verbal adjectives occur.  The verbal adjectives follow an 
imperative, ἰὲ“to say” Socrates has advised us that, much like an expert measurer, we should 
place the pleasures and pains together in the same scale.  Moments later, he implores us to “say 
(ἰὲwhich of the two is greater” (356b2).  Only then do we get the verbal adjectives.  Given 
the imperative, commentators have reasoned that the verbal adjectives are more naturally read as 
gerundives, specifying what ought to be done.  Or that the imperative signals a recommended 
procedure— one which ought to be followed.13  Along similar lines, it has been observed that, 
since there is no clear statement of psychological hedonism in the immediate neighborhood prior 
to the use of the verbal adjectives, the Many (against whom Socrates is presently arguing) could 
not reasonably be expected to understand the verbal adjectives as implying anything other than a 
prudential obligation.
14
 These observations pose problems for the psychological necessity 
interpretation; and these problems are only intensified by other features of the context.  For 
example, the verbal adjectives occur within the second substitution, parallel to the first, where 
the arrogant questioner had pointed out that the goods by which the weak man is defeated are not 
worthy (ἀί) of the victory.  The value-term here, ἀί, reappears after the second 
substitution.  At 356a, Socrates says that the pleasures by which our man is defeated are not 
worthy (ἀί) of the victory.  Commentators have pointed out that, in the context of choice, 
ἀί naturally implies a prudential obligation, since an action that contains pleasures worthy of 
                                                          
13
 Wolfsorf has correctly noted that the imperative here is “perfectly compatible” with either the psychological 
necessity or the prudential obligation.  However, while the imperative is compatible with either interpretation, it is 
much more natural to take it as signaling a prudential obligation.  See also D. Wolfsdorf (2006). 
 
14
 Wolfsdorf  (2006) pg. 125 
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victory ought therefore to be chosen (ά).  And so, an examination of the immediate 
context appears to condemn the psychological necessity interpretation.
15
 
Some commentators have adopted the psychological necessity interpretation nonetheless.  
Their insistence is, in large part, a consequence of our third passage, often seen as evidence that 
(PH) factors into the demonstration.  At 358c, after Socrates has reached his conclusion that 
being overcome by pleasure is merely ignorance, he introduces (PH) alongside his intellectualist 
thesis that ‘no one errs willingly.’ 
 
“Then it must follow that no one willingly goes for bad things or things he believes to be bad.  To make for 
what one believes to be bad, instead of making for the good, is not, it seems, in human nature, and when 
faced with the choice between two evils no one will choose the greater when he might choose the less.”  
(358c-d) 
 
This is the clearest formulation of (PH) in the dialogue.  And so, even despite the fact that 
‘ought’ is the more natural reading of the verbal adjectives, commentators have argued that (PH) 
is surely intended, since the intellectualist thesis features prominently in the discussion after 
Socrates’ explanation of weakness, and is accompanied by (PH).16  After all, Socrates 
unequivocally refers to human nature.  He argues that it is not possible (given human nature) to 
choose the greater of two available evils.  In a context where pleasure is the only recognized 
good, and pain is the only recognized evil, this statement clearly invokes (PH). 
                                                          
15
 In further support of this, it has been documented that nearly every occurrence of these verbal adjectives in Plato 
signifies a prudential obligation.  Taylor (1990, 190) writes that in “all the Platonic uses of έ𝜍 and έ𝜍 
recorded by Ast., the context is one where a course of action is recommended.” Brandwood cites two instances of 
 (Phileb. 34 d2, 61 a5) and six instances of  (Crito 46 b3, 47 b9; Grg. 499 e4, 506 c8; Rep 457).  
Each of these instances speak against a psychological necessity reading.  There is one possible exception.  Wolfsdorf 
(2006) has shown that the passage at Grg. 499 e1-7 suggests a psychological necessity using the verb έ.  
And so, while there is some evidence outside of the Protagoras for using these verbal adjectives for psychological 
necessity, it is very minimal. 
 
16
  See footnote 2 
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 But there are problems for this passage as well.  The passage occurs at such an extremely 
late stage in Socrates’ demonstration that it cannot reasonably be thought to constitute a major 
premise in his argument against (E).  Here, psychological hedonism (PH) appears as more of a 
“corollary to the conclusion that wrongdoing is ignorance” than a major premise in the argument 
establishing the ridiculousness of (E).
17
  Along these lines, one cannot be expected to take the 
intellectualist thesis, tagged haphazardly on to the end of an argument, and run it backwards 
through the argument to which it is conjoined.  I believe this objection, first formulated by 
Dyson, can gain further support from another observation which has not yet found a place in the 
literature.  Consider the following observation. 
Socrates begins addressing the Many at 352d, where he extends his invitation to 
Protagoras, saying “Come, attempt with me to persuade the Many and to teach them what this 
experience is…” at which point the dialogue with the Many ensues.  The dialogue continues until 
358a, where Socrates finally brings it to an end, saying “…these are the answers we would have 
given to the Many.”  At 358a, then, the conversation with the Many is over.  Socrates turns his 
attention back to Hippias, Prodicus and Protagoras, three of the Sophists present in the audience.  
Directing his words toward them, he asks “Hippias and Proticus, along with Protagoras—for you 
too may share in the discussion—is what I am saying true or false in your opinion?”  It is only 
after Socrates has ceased to address the Many, and has begun to address the Sophists, that he 
formulates his intellectualist thesis, resulting in the passage above (358c-d).  I suggest that it is 
implausible that the intellectualist thesis and the articulation of (PH) would factor into the 
argument against the Many, when the conversation with the Many has already ended.  Those 
who endorse the psychological necessity interpretation will have a hard time explaining why 
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Socrates expresses such a crucial premise only after the argument has ended, and only after 
Socrates’ respondent has changed.  Nor should our passage be taken to inform the verbal 
adjectives of 358b, since Socrates has (in the meantime) shifted his attention from the Many to 
the Sophists.  Socrates had previously used the verbal adjectives (358b) while demonstrating to 
the Many that their explanation (E) was ridiculous; yet he articulates psychological hedonism 
(358c-d) while addressing the Sophists only after the dialogue with the Many has ended.  Placed 
alongside the previous evidence, this observation has led me to reject the psychological necessity 
interpretation.  
The epistemic interpretation, however, provides another possible account of the 
ridiculousness of (E).  According to this interpretation, (E) is ridiculous because it attributes 
knowledge to an agent, while also claiming that he has no such knowledge.  (The weak man 
knows what’s best, but performs a different action willingly, because he doesn’t know what’s 
best).  In this case, the ridiculousness of (E) is made clear around 357d, upon the second 
substitution, where Socrates demonstrates that being defeated by pleasure is merely a lack of 
knowledge.  The end result is that (E) reduces to the claim that a man performs an action, 
knowing it to contain more pain than pleasure, because he does not know it to contain more pain 
than pleasure.  In order to uncover this contradiction, Gallop has suggested that we think of (E) 
as a compound assertion involving two separate claims, (Ea) and (Eb): 
 
 (E):  (Ea) the weak man knows 𝜙 to be bad, yet nevertheless 
         (Eb) he performs 𝜙 willingly because he is overcome by pleasures. 
 
According to Gallop, Socrates argues (using the two substitutions) that (Eb) entails the denial of 
(Ea).  Thus, as soon as the Many agree that being “overcome (ἡώ𝜍by pleasures” is the 
same thing as not knowing the value of an action, the logical contradiction has emerged.  By 
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asserting (E), the Many have inconsistently attributed both knowledge (concerning the value of 
𝜙) and ignorance (concerning the value of 𝜙) to the weak man.  This contradiction is never 
made explicit in the text, but it can be drawn from the text without too much interpretive strain, 
and it makes the ridiculousness of (E) much more palpable.  That being said, however, the 
epistemic interpretation does require that a connection be established between error and 
ignorance.  In other words, it must be explained how (Eb) entails the denial of (Ea).  
(Incidentally, this will require an explanation of how being “overcome by pleasure” is the same 
thing as not knowing the value of an action.)  And Gallop establishes this entailment by invoking 
psychological hedonism (PH).  According to Gallop, 
 
“when Socrates claims that we should be saved by the art of measurement, he is assuming that if only we 
had such an art we should unquestionably apply it in any given situation, and act in accordance with the 
results it yielded.”   
 
For Gallop, the key to Socrates’ argument is psychological hedonism (PH).  But a few problems 
emerge from this suggestion.  First, we have already observed that the context did not favor the 
inclusion of (PH).  Second, for Socrates to claim that men always act in accordance with the 
results of their measurements, or that men must necessarily choose the action they judge most 
pleasant overall, is simply to beg the question against the phenomenon   𝜍) being 
explained.
18
  In other words, the inclusion of (PH) makes for a bad argument.  And finally, if we 
allow that (PH) plays a significant role in the argument against (E), then the ridiculousness of (E) 
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 Presumably, this is why the present argument is often mistakenly portrayed as the denial of akrasia, and not as an 
argument for the strength of knowledge (KS).  Socrates makes it quite clear that he is arguing not against the 
phenomenon of weakness, but against the explanation of it (E).  Also, the modern conception of akrasia involves 
acting against one’s belief about what’s best, but he does not speak of belief until after the argument with the Many 
has ended.  He is concerned with the strength of knowledge (KS). 
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will have been explicable already by means of the psychological necessity interpretation. In this 




IV. Modifying the Epistemic Interpretation   
 
Commentators have typically assumed that the epistemic interpretation requires psychological 
hedonism to establish the connection between error and ignorance, that (PH) is required to 
explain how (Eb) entails the denial of (Ea).  However, it may be worthwhile to explore the text 
for another possibility.  Perhaps the entailment can be established without psychological 
hedonism (PH).  In this section, I propose a version of the epistemic interpretation which does 
not invoke (PH).  I maintain that (E) is ridiculous because it attributes knowledge to an agent 
while also claiming that he has no such knowledge, and that the knowledge in question concerns 
pleasures and pains, good and bad.  However, we might notice that Plato never puts the relevant 
knowledge exclusively in terms of actions or consequences.  The knowledge attributed to the 
weak man is described generally as the knowledge “of bad things that they are bad.”20  Thus, we 
ought to think of (E) as the following compound assertion: 
 
 (E):  (Ea*) the weak man knows of bad things that they are bad, yet nevertheless 
         (Eb)  he performs a bad action 𝜙 willingly because he is overcome by pleasures. 
 
Of course, if our man knows of bad things that they are bad, then he knows of 𝜙 that it is a bad 
action.  Yet, according to (E), he performs 𝜙 because he is overcome by pleasure.  We have seen 
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 Even if the epistemic interpretation gains explicitness over the psychological necessity interpretation (which 
seems correct to me) the interpretation will be rendered somewhat gratuitous. 
 
20
  It is clear that Socrates often has actions and consequences in mind, but he does not depict the weak man’s 
knowledge (or the science of measurement) in these terms exclusively.  Instead, the relevant knowledge is put in 
general terms.  For instance, 355a6, and 355c2, and throughout the argument, Socrates attributes to the weak man 
the knowledge of bad things that they are bad (ώὰ ὰὅάἐ 
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(356b), however, that the phenomenon of being overcome by pleasure is explained by reference 
to the power of appearance, so that the weak man performs 𝜙 because he is swayed by the power 
of appearance.  Moreover, Socrates has informed the Many that the power of appearance is 
deceptive— that it causes confusion by making the nearer pleasure seem greater than it really is.  
And the only antidote to this illusion is the science of measurement, which enables one to place 
pleasurable things and painful things into the same scale together, regardless of temporal 
distance.  This technique procures expert knowledge (ἐή) of the relative value of things.  
In other words, the science of measurement procures knowledge of bad things that they are bad, 
of good things that they are good.  And, as the only antidote to the power of appearance, Socrates 
declares this “our salvation in life” 
 The term ‘salvation’ (ίplays an interesting role in Socrates’ demonstration.  At 
356d, it is simply equated with the science of measurement— Socrates says that the science of 
measurement is the thing that will “save our life” (ἔἄὸίMoments later, 
however, Socrates elaborates.  Here, at 357a, the actual correct choice of pleasure and pain is our 
salvation (ίIn other words, our salvation consists not just in the possession of the 
science of measurement, but in our choosing to act in accordance with its results.  These two 
conditions, then—possession and application—appear to be necessary, and jointly sufficient for 
our salvation.  Thus, Socrates proceeds to pose the following question.  “Since our salvation in 
life has turned out to lie in the correct choice of pleasure and pain…is it not first a question of 
measurement, consisting as it does in a consideration of relative excess, defect, or equality?”  
This is surely right. 
Concerning the significance of the term ‘salvation’ (ίῦί Gallop has 
correctly noted that “salvation acts as a bridge by which the concepts of knowledge and correct 
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choice can be equated.”  The converse holds true as well— salvation acts as a bridge connecting 
error with ignorance. Of course, Gallop’s conclusion is that Socrates merely assumes that “if 
only we had such an art we should unquestionably apply it in any given situation, and act in 
accordance with the results it yielded.”  This is true, according to Gallop, because Socrates is 
assuming psychological hedonism (PH).  Indeed, it may seem natural to import (PH), or to 
assume that Socrates simply ignores the possibility that an agent could possess the relevant 
knowledge, but choose not to apply it.  In fact, many commentators have drawn this conclusion.  
After all, if we import psychological hedonism into the argument, then we will be equipped to 
explain how the bridge works, and to draw Gallop’s conclusion that (Eb) entails the denial of 
(Ea*).  Unfortunately, however, we have encountered good reasons for thinking the (PH) does 
not factor into the demonstration.  So let us re-examine the entailment that the epistemic 
interpretation must establish.  The entailment of ignorance from error can be expressed by the 
following conditional: 
 
If a man performs a bad action 𝜙 willingly because he is overcome by pleasures (Eb), then he does not 
know of bad things that they are bad (not-Ea*). 
 
Or, given Socrates’ assessment of what being overcome by pleasure really amounts to, the 
entailment becomes: 
 
If a man performs a bad action 𝜙 willingly because he is swayed by the power of appearance (Eb), then he 
does not know of bad things that they are bad (not-Ea*). 
 
This conditional must be established by the epistemic interpretation in one way or another.  And 
I am in agreement with Gallop that the concept of salvation acts as a bridge connecting the 
antecedent with the consequent.  But perhaps the inclusion of (PH) is unnecessary here.  Let me 
explain.  There appear to be two possible scenarios capable of producing the weak man’s error 
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(Eb).  First, supposing the weak man is swayed by the power of appearance because he lacks the 
science of measurement, what he lacks is knowledge, and his error is the result of ignorance.  
This much is clear.  But let us briefly consider the other possibility; the possibility Socrates 
supposedly ignores; the possibility that an agent might possess the science of measurement but 
choose not to apply its results. In this scenario, the agent might be said to yield to the power of 
appearance even though she possesses the antidote.  Perhaps she even performs the necessary 
calculations, placing both pleasurable and painful consequences together into the same scale in 
order to determine that 𝜙 is a bad action.  But she ultimately disregards her results and chooses 
to act contrary to her science.  She knows that 𝜙 is a bad action, yet she performs 𝜙 willingly and 
knowingly nevertheless.  In order to establish the relevant conditional, this scenario must be 
explained away.
21
     
It is crucial to remember that our salvation in life (ίῦίwas said to 
consist not merely in the possession of this science, but also in its application.  Salvation was 
said to consist in correct choice.  As a result, the agent who disregards her science has thereby 
failed to save her own life.  At this point, an important question arises.  What does it mean for 
Socrates to say that the science of measurement will save our life (ἔἄὸί?  What 
will it save us from?  Surprisingly, commentators have ignored this question completely, perhaps 
because it is not explicitly answered in our text.  As far as I can tell, however, this question is 
essential to understanding Socrates’ argument. 
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  Psychological hedonism (PH) would render this scenario impossible by psychological law, thus establishing the 
conditional.  But what happens when we don’t import (PH) into the argument?  Taylor (1990), who isn’t convinced 
that (PH) factors into the argument against the Many, concludes that the argument is based on fallacy, since it 
overlooks the possibility that one might possess, but not apply, their knowledge.  For Taylor (1990), Socrates proves 
only that if one chooses correctly, then one possesses the science of measurement.  But Socrates conclusion is our 
conditional  if one does not choose correctly, then one does not possess the science of measurement.  Thus, as 
Klosko (1980) later put it, “Taylor objects to this conclusion as established through the simple fallacy of denying the 
antecedent (p.318).”  As I will argue, however, Socrates’ use of “salvation” may provide a way out of this 
accusation. 
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The most natural answer is that the science of measurement will save us from a bad life.  
It will save us from a life that is not worth living.  Consider, for instance, Socrates’ language at 
356d, where he equates the salvation of our life (ίῦίwith faring well 
(ὖάor being happy.22  For Plato, faring well (ὖάis associated with 
happiness (ὐί) and the good life.  Thus, to save one’s life is to make one’s life good.23  
But we should notice that Socrates’ language here is suggestive of an all-or-nothing affair— the 
agent’s entire life depends on their choice.  One commentator writes that “Socrates’ emphasis on 
saving one’s life is deliberate… [Socrates] says that, if one’s life depended on […] making 
correct judgments and choices based on them, one would not be able to rely on observation of 
how things look etc., but would require a technique of measurement.”24  I would add, moreover, 
that the use of salvation makes it perfectly clear that (at least on the assumption of hedonism) our 
life does depend on this technique.  In particular, it is essential to Socrates’ demonstration that, 
without the application of this technique, our lives will go bad.  This adds depth to Socrates’ 
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  356d:   “If our faring well (ἡῑἦὖά) had depended on taking steps to get large quantities, and avoid 
small ones, what should we have judged to be the salvation of our lives (ἡῑίῡί)?”  Here, as I see 
it, the salvation of our lives (i.e. the science of measurement) is what secures the good life (ὖά).  And if we 
do not save our life, then our life will go bad.   Compare, for instance, Socrates’ language in the Crito (47e-48a).  
“What about the part of us which is damaged by wrong actions and benefited by right ones?  Is life worth living with 
this part ruined?  Certainly not…At the same time, I should like you to consider whether we are still satisfied on this 
point, that the really important thing is not to live, but to live well (ὸὖῆ).” 
  
23
  See Charmides 171e7: “With error abolished, and correctness guiding, men in that condition [i.e. who possess 
such knowledge] would necessarily fare finely and fare well (ὖά) in their every action, and those faring 
well are happy.”  ὖά  is also used interchangeably with ὐό in the Euthydemus at 282a.   
 
24
  See Taylor (1990, 191).  Taylor writes concerning this argument that it simply “ignores the distinction between 
being regularly right and being right on every occasion which Socrates’ exposition requires.” We might wonder why 
Socrates depicts this as an all-or-nothing affair, and why only the good life (ὖ ά) and the bad life are 
represented here (i.e. why no intermediary lives).  Regardless, it is clear according to Socrates, that the agent’s entire 
life will be determined by their correct choice.  From Socrates’ argument, we get the distinct sense that the agent’s 
life is at stake.  
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argument by introducing relative values, not just of actions and consequence, but of lives as a 
whole (ῦί).25  
Let us now return to our agent who chooses not to apply her science.  If indeed the 
application of the science of measurement is the only thing that will save us from a bad life, then 
the agent who chooses not to apply her science will have successfully ruined her own life.  Of 
course, it goes without saying that she wanted to fare well and be happy. This is the core or 
Greek eudaemonism— that all human beings desire their own happiness, and that happiness is 
the goal (έ𝜍) of all their rational acts.  As Vlastos puts it, “this is so deep-seated an 
assumption that it is simply taken for granted:  no argument is ever given for it in the Platonic 
corpus.”26  All men desire to fare well.  In fact, faring well is the decisive consideration of 
human action.  In the Euthydemus, Socrates states this assumption most emphatically: 
 
“Do not all men want (ύ) to fare well (ὖά)?  Or is this not one of the things which I 
feared a moment ago it would be ridiculous (ά) to question?  For surely it is silly to ask such 
a question.  For which man does not want to fare well?”     Euthy 278e 
 
Since our agent’s primary desire is for the enjoyment of a good life (ὖά, we might 
wonder why she has chosen not to apply the science that would have secured it.
27
   
                                                          
25
   Vlastos (1969) makes an interesting terminological point concerning our passage.  He notes that “good” and 
“bad” and their comparative and superlative forms “are used in the debate to express both first-order and second-
order valuations, without any alternative expressions or any auxiliary linguistic devices to mark off the differences.”  
According to Vlastos, Socrates is sometimes speaking of the goodness or badness of actions, which is a second-
order valuation that consists of weighing good and bad consequences (the first-order valuations).  By focusing on 
Socrates’ use of “salvation of one’s life,” my interpretation actually locates an additional layer of complexity.  The 
goodness or badness of a life will be a third-order valuation.   In this way, “salvation of life” (ίῡί) 
serves as a value-term associated with the good life, much like  was used previously as a value-term 
associated with good consequences/actions.   See Vlastos (1969). 
 
26
   Vlastos, (1985),  pp.3-22 (footnote 14). 
 
27
  Let me respond to any potential objection having to do with my equating the “good life” with the notion of faring 
well (ὖά).  Socrates has already connected faring well with the salvation of one’s life (356d), which causes 
us to interpret the notion of faring well in terms of life as a whole.  But, I will also quote from Bobonich (2011), who 
has written recently concerning the common, non-philosophical notion of happiness that would have been prevalent 
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At this point, it should become clear that the epistemic interpretation can succeed without 
importing psychological hedonism (PH) into the demonstration.  Given Plato’s frequent 
emphasis on “saving one’s life,” a much weaker principle will do the trick.  I suspect that Plato is 
merely assuming that no one would knowingly ruin their own life.  It is reasonable to think that 
anyone who disregards her science, precisely when her life depends on it, simply does not know 
that her life depends on it.
28
  In other words, perhaps Plato is assuming a version of 
psychological eudaemonism. 
 
(PE) Necessarily, men only choose actions they believe to be consistent with their own 
welfare— i.e.  the happiness (ὖάof a good life (ὖῆ. 
 
According to (PE), it would be impossible for a human being to knowingly or willingly ruin their 
own life.  Thus, regarding the agent who possesses but chooses not apply her science, the only 
remaining explanation is that the agent does not know that her life depends on her correct choice 
concerning 𝜙.    Perhaps she understands (in some sense) that 𝜙 is a bad action when she chooses 
to perform 𝜙, but she doesn’t fully appreciate the impact her choice will have on her life as a 
whole.  In other words, she does not know that she is making a bad life for herself.  Needless to 
say, this would constitute an intellectual error— a species of ignorance.  But here’s the most 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
among the Many.  He writes that “two central lines of thought [were] already implicit in early non-philosophical 
claims about happiness that are especially important for the later Greek philosophical tradition [i.e. Socrates,  Plato, 
Aristotle].  The first of these understands being happy and happiness in terms of well-being (ὖά).  As a 
first approximation, let us say that a person is happy or attains happiness if and only if he lives a life that is best for 
him, all things considered.”  The version of psychological eudaemonism I propose above (PE) is slightly weaker.  It 
requires only that the agent act consistently with what they see as a good life, not necessarily with the optimally best 
life.  See Bobonich, (2011), p.295. 
 
28
 Compare Aristotle, in Book III of  Nichomachean Ethics.  There, he discusses the nature of voluntary and 
involuntary acts.  He briefly considers a borderline case of voluntary action in which the agent must throw cargo 
overboard in a storm in order to “save his life (ί).”  Aristotle comments that “anyone having a mind” 
(ἁά𝜍ὁῡ 𝜍) would choose to save his life.  I suspect that Socrates, and perhaps Aristotle too, would 
classify the agent who chooses to go down with his cargo—  or by analogy here, to go down with the immediate 
pleasure— thus failing to save his own life, as ignorant of the relative values of the actions available to him.  
Perhaps they would even call this “the greatest ignorance,” see 357e. 
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crucial point.  If an agent does not know of the life that she is making that it is a bad life, then 
she cannot be said to know of bad things that they are bad.  And this is the denial of (Ea*).  As it 
turns out, then, the agent cannot be said to possess the science of measurement.
29
  And so, the 
required entailment has been established by means of psychological eudaemonism (PE); for the 
failure to apply the science of measurement simply collapses into a failure to possess it.  And, in 
this way, we come to agree with Gallop’s claim. 
“when Socrates claims that we should be saved by the art of measurement, he is assuming that if only we 
had such an art we should unquestionably apply it in any given situation, and act in accordance with the 
results it yielded.”   
 
But we arrive at this agreement by means of psychological eudaemonism (PE), which is distinct 
from psychological hedonism (PH).  According to psychological hedonism (PH), one must 
always choose the action they think most pleasant.  In contrast, according to eudaemonism (PE), 
one is capable of choosing the less pleasant option (overall), but only under special 
circumstances— only under circumstances in which the agent underestimates the impact this will 
have on her life as a whole.  Thus, an agent can perform a bad action, while thinking that it is 
bad, only if they do not understand that (by doing so) they are making a bad life for themselves.  
In this sense, eudaemonism (PE) is much weaker than psychological hedonism (PH).  Yet 
eudaemonism (PE) is perfectly capable of explaining how (Eb) entails the denial of (Ea*).  
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 After all, the science of measurement procures knowledge of bad things that they are bad, and of good things that 
they are good.  In other words, it is possible that a weak agent might underestimate the impact her choice will have 
on the value of her life.  By choosing a bad action 𝜙, she may not know that she is making a bad life for herself.  
But, then, she certainly does not know of bad things that they are bad.  Furthermore, since she fails to see how 𝜙 
affects her life as a whole, we cannot attribute to her the expert knowledge that 𝜙 is a bad action.  Expert knowledge 
of good and bad will include an understanding of how an action stands in relation to the good life.  Thus, it is clear 
that she does not possess the science of measurement. 
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Moreover, it allows us to identify what is distinctive about the weak man’s state of mind.  He, 
unlike the expert, does not understand that his life depends on each and every choice he makes.
30
   
One problem, however, is that psychological eudaemonism (PE) is never explicitly stated 
within the argument.  That being said, let us look very closely at what is stated.  We have already 
observed that, by employing the concept of our salvation in life (ίῦίSocrates 
has introduced additional valuations not just of actions and consequences, but of lives as a 
whole.  The only other claim Socrates makes about life as a whole (within our argument) occurs 
immediately after his bold statement that “the entire demonstration depends” on a single point 
(355a). 
“It isn’t easy to explain the real meaning of what you call being overcome by pleasure, and any 
demonstration is bound up in this point.  It is still possible, even now, to retract a step, if in some way you 
can state that the good is something other than the pleasant, or that the bad is something other than the 
painful.  Or is it sufficient (ἀῖ) for you to live out your life (ῶὸί) pleasantly, in the 
absence of pain?  If it is enough, and you can’t state that the good or the bad is anything other than that 
which does not end in these, then listen to what comes next. For this being the case, your explanation 
becomes ridiculous.”          (355a) 
 
Here, Socrates claims that the demonstration depends on whether it is sufficient (ἀῖ) for the 
people to live out their lives (ὸί) pleasurably, in the absence of pain.  But sufficient for 
what?   Apparently, Socrates thinks he must determine (for his demonstration) whether the 
people will get what they want out of life if they (merely) live pleasantly.  Of course, the people 
ultimately want to fare well (ὖά and be happy.  And so, Socrates is asking whether a 
life of pleasure is sufficient for a good and happy life.  This passage echoes the question Socrates 
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 Concerning Socrates’ argument as a whole, one defect seems to emerge from the present reading.  The argument 
ignores an important distinction.  As Taylor (1990) has already observed, the argument “ignores the distinction 
between being regularly right, and being right on every occasion, which Socrates’ exposition requires. (p. 192)”   
Socrates seems to be suggesting that the good life (salvation) requires one to be right on every occasion.  (Perhaps, 
however, this sense of urgency is precisely what wisdom requires.  Socrates himself notoriously lived as if his life 
depended upon each and every action he performed). 
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had previously posed to Protagoras concerning pleasure (351b) in the opening lines of our 
discussion.    
“ Do you say, Protagoras,” I said, “that some human beings live well (ὖῆ), others badly?”  He said he 
did.  “Is it your opinion then that a human being would live well (ὖῆ) if he should live with distress and 
pain?”  He said no.  “And what if he should come to the end having lived out his life () pleasantly?  
Isn’t it your opinion that he would have thus lived well (ὖέ)?”     351b 
 
But why would an answer to this question be essential to Socrates’ demonstration?  Why would 
Socrates say that the whole demonstration depends on this, for instance, rather than one of the 
passages often used in support of (PH)?  Perhaps Plato is insinuating that the good life somehow 
matters to the argument.  In order to determine what the people actually pursue, Socrates must 
determine what they consider the good life to be.  In other words, Socrates is assuming that 
whatever one pursues, one ultimately pursues for the sake of a good and happy life.  Perhaps this 
falls short of an explicit statement of (PE).  But it does confirm that something sufficiently like 
(PE) is operative.  
  Finally, it is worth noting that, if psychological hedonism (PH) were operative instead of 
(PE), an answer to this question would not be important at all.  For, in that case, a refutation of 
(E) would require no reference to life as a whole, to faring well (ὖά, or to being 
happy.  In a similar way, we have seen Socrates use the notion of one’s “salvation in life” as a 
bridge connecting ignorance and error.  But again, if (PH) were indeed operative in Socrates’ 
demonstration, the bridge would not be necessary. Psychological hedonism (PH) conjoins 
ignorance and error (correct choice and knowledge) automatically, quite independently of the 
notion of salvation.
31
  If (PH) were operative, the notion of salvation would not have been 
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 This is my chief criticism of Gallop (1964), who admits that the concept of salvation acts as a bridge connecting 
knowledge with correct choice, but simply does not explain how this works.  Moreover, his inclusion of (PH) in the 
argument puts the concept of salvation out of a job.  Once we assume that (PH) is operative in the argument, the 
ridiculousness of (E) can be explained without the employment of such a concept. 
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required.  Thus, psychological eudaemonism (PE) appears to be the only principle capable of 
imbuing these details with the significance Plato has lavished on them.  Although I do not wish 
to argue the point here, I believe (PE) offers a much better analysis of the strength of knowledge 
(KS) as well.
32
  In the meantime, let me simply state that each of these considerations against 
(PH) are symptoms of the same basic defect.  As a premise in the argument against (E), (PH) is 
simply too strong.  Commentators have invoked (PH) to explain how Socrates’ argument works, 
but (PH) actually spoils the mechanics of the demonstration at every turn.
33
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 Two separate notions of strength have occupied the literature— an economic notion and a diachronic notion.  
Socrates initially inquires into Protagoras’ view of knowledge (at 352c) with the question, “…do you think that … if 
someone knows what is good and what is bad, he will never be conquered by anything so as to do otherwise than 
knowledge bids him?”  (The answer is affirmative).  This has been referred to as the economic strength of 
knowledge (one who knows will always act upon their knowledge, even if other psychological factors happen to be 
present).  The notion of diachronic strength is then developed after the second substitution, as Socrates introduces 
the science of measurement.  According to Socrates, the power of appearance causes vacillation (ἐά) by 
making the nearer pleasure appear greater than it really is, while the science of measurement renders this appearance 
ineffective (ἄ) and makes our soul to remain (έ) in the truth, thus saving our life.  The fact that the 
science of measurement prevents such vacillation indicates that knowledge is strong because it remains stable 
diachronically.  It allows one to maintain “intellectual grip” on the truth as different viewpoints are presented 
through time.  Thus, Socrates’ discussion with the Many is generated by an economic notion of strength; but it ends 
with the diachronic notion.  Both are attributed to knowledge; neither is attributed to belief.  My interpretation 
enables knowledge to enjoy both economic and diachronic strength.  According to the modified interpretation, 
knowledge of the value of any given action involves an understanding of how the action impacts one’s life as a 
whole— to possess the science of measurement is to know (among other things) that the value of one’s life depends 
on one’s choice, and that correct choice is the difference between faring well (ὖά) and faring badly.  As a 
result, the agent who knows which action is best will necessarily act accordingly, since this directly engages the 
agent’s most fundamental desire to fare well (PE).  In this way, the knowledge of good and bad will always govern 
the actions of its possessor.  Knowledge is economically strong.  The modified epistemic interpretation also allows 
knowledge to exhibit diachronic strength.  Knowledge of the goodness or badness of any given action will involve a 
comprehensive understanding of the good life and how that particular action stands in relation to the good life.  This 
provides a unique perspective, which maintains a view to one’s life as a whole.  This is essential to Socrates’ 
demonstration.  As Taylor puts it, for Socrates, salvation requires “the ability to abstract oneself from one’s actual 
temporal situation, so as to give one’s future desires and interests equal weight or importance with one’s present 
desires and interests (p.193).” The modified interpretation ascribes to knowledge the kind of perspective we would 
expect to remain diachronically stable.  Socrates’ demonstration to the Many is silent about the relative strength of 
belief.   
 
33
   Of course, a story must be told as to why the intellectualist thesis and its corollary (PH) are expressed 
immediately after the discussion with the Many.  Protagoras had initially rejected (H) in favor of the view that some 
pleasures are good, while others are bad.  But after Socrates flatters the Sophists with a professional endorsement 
(357d-e), Protagoras readily changes his mind, and accepts (H).  Having earned his trust complete, Socrates then 
acquires (PH) from Protagoras, which Socrates then uses to refute Protagoras’ initial position regarding the virtues 
(that courage is different from the other virtues).  Thus, (PE) is used to refute the Many, and (PH) is used to refute 
Protagoras.   
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